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How to sow and reap as you go: a simple model of cyclical endogenous growth 
Adriaan van Zon, Emmanuelle Fortune and Tobias Kronenberg 
(MERIT, Maastricht, September 2003,) 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we present a simple endogenous growth model that allows for the 
occurrence of innovations that can develop into General Purpose Technologies (GPTs), which 
are the result of basic R&D. The model incorporates the main features of the Romer (1990) 
model and the Aghion and Howitt (1992) model by using multi-level Ethier functions on the 
one hand, and Poisson processes to describe the arrival of innovations produced by 
performing basic R&D and applied R&D. Through basic R&D the core of a potentially new 
GPT enters the economic system. This core offers the possibility for further expansion of the 
potential GPT through applied R&D by adding peripherals to this core. The characteristics of 
the new potential GPT that is represented by the core are randomly distributed. These 
characteristics include intrinsic profitability, scope for expansion, as well as R&D 
opportunities and efficiency of the corresponding applied R&D process. By using some 
illustrative simulations with the model, we show that the arrival of a successful GPT does 
indeed bring about a reallocation of R&D activities towards applied R&D, thus postponing 
the moment of arrival of the next GPT. Meanwhile, applied R&D raises the productivity of 
the GPT as a whole. But the profitability of finding the next/marginal peripheral falls in the 
process. This fall in marginal profits diminishes the incentives to engage in further applied 
R&D and increases the incentives to move into basic R&D activities again. Thus, we obtain a 
cyclical pattern in output growth that is not only partly driven by the arrival of the new 
potential GPTs but also by the continuing development of existing GPTs in the absence of the 
arrival of new ones. In periods that do not give rise to the arrival of new successful GPTs we 
find instances of alternating expansions of existing GPTs that have the character of a GPT-
race.  
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1. Introduction  
Historical evidence indicates that neither production nor technological progress is a 
smooth process.
1 This notion of technological waves has first been advanced by Schumpeter 
(1939). He proposed that drastic technological innovation might be the cause of long-run 
cycles by involving discontinuities in the process of technological innovation.  
When we hear about innovations, the common vision, that comes to mind, is that of 
drastic innovations. Drastic innovations are radically new ideas that are reached after 
deliberate efforts at combining previously unrelated ideas. Therefore, they have no obvious 
antecedents. This phenomenon has been described as a ￿new combination￿ in Schumpeter 
(1934), ￿basic innovation￿ in Mensch (1979), ￿macro-innovation￿ in Mokyr (1990), and as 
￿fundamental innovation￿ in Aghion and Howitt (1998). Drastic innovations are by nature 
associated with high risks and costs, but usually with the possibility of significant financial 
returns. The entrepreneur is the main agent in this process and his unique motive is 
commercial success. In drastic innovations, each new generation good is so much better than 
its predecessors that the latest innovator is hardly constrained by potential competition from 
owners of previous patents. This latest innovator is, then, a monopolist and he sets the 
maximum price that gives the previous innovators non-positive profits and satisfies all the 
demand at that price, leaving none to the previous innovators. From a technological point of 
view, however, the most important characteristic of a drastic innovation is that it opens up 
new fields of technological development opportunities. The concept is, therefore, closely 
related to what Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) and Helpman (1998) refer to as ￿General 
Purpose Technology￿ (GPT). And the concept is, moreover, closely related to what Aghion 
and Howitt (1992 and 1998) refer to as quality-improving innovation.  
The Aghion and Howitt (1992 and 1998 ch. 2) models start from the assumptions that 
innovations are drastic and technical change is completely embodied in new intermediate 
goods that use only the latest technology. Therefore, technical change takes the form of 
quality-improving innovation (vertical product differentiation), and only one intermediate 
good is used at a certain point in time. Succeeding intermediate goods embody quality 
improvement, which render their predecessors obsolete. This is the ￿creative destruction￿ 
effect pointed out by Schumpeter (1934). One of the most interesting features of the Aghion 
                                                 
1 See on this subject, for instance, Olsson (2001) and Gordon (2000).   3
and Howitt model is that the uncertainty of the research process implies the possibility of 
cyclical growth patterns.  
We usually contrast drastic innovation with incremental innovations. Incremental 
innovations are small, non-revolutionary changes in technology that are carried out by profit-
oriented entrepreneurs. These incremental innovations refine existing knowledge in a 
predictable fashion and are generated when entrepreneurs combine older insights that are 
closely related from a technological point of view. This phenomenon has, also, been described 
as ￿micro-innovations￿ in Mokyr (1990), ￿refinements￿ in Jovanovic and Rob (1990), and 
￿secondary innovations￿ in Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch. 6). The costs and risks associated 
with these incremental innovations activity are relatively low. And the boundaries to 
incremental innovation are set by the prevailing technological family, which defines the 
opportunities of technological research at some point in time. As Dosi (1988), we can say that 
incremental innovations are highly path dependent, following specific technological 
trajectories. The most important characteristic of an incremental innovation is, therefore, that 
it belongs to a technology family. The concept is closely related to Romer (1990), because 
this model uses the concept of intermediate goods that are built in accordance with specific 
blueprints. These intermediate goods could be seen as incremental innovations, because the 
Romer model assumes that technical change is embodied in the ensemble of intermediate 
goods rather than in only one new intermediate good as in Aghion and Howitt model. This 
technical change takes the form of variety-improving innovation (horizontal product 
differentiation), and the productivity of all intermediate goods is the same because Romer has 
assumed that intermediate goods are completely symmetric with respect to their contribution 
to output.
2 Because of this symmetry between intermediates, technical change only increases 
the number of all intermediate goods used in producing output. But by doing so, technical 
change does generate productivity growth through improved division of production tasks 
between intermediates. The main idea of the Romer model is that an increase in the number of 
intermediates facilitates the division of production activities in a way that is comparable to the 
notion of Smithsonian labour division, because the technical change is of an organizational 
nature.  
In order to introduce vertical product differentiation to be able to cover the arrival of 
drastic innovations and their subsequent expansion into GPTs, we therefore have to include 
                                                 
2 On this subject, chapter 6 of Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) considers models in which technological progress 
shows up as an expansion of the number of varieties of products.    4
asymmetries in the contribution of intermediates to final output. We do this by respecifying 
the Ethier production structure into a multi-level one, where the upper-level combines GPTs 
to generate output, and where the lower levels describe how the components of a GPT define 
and drive the further development of a GPT. 
This asymmetry between intermediates introduces qualities differences between 
intermediates as in van Zon and Yetkiner (2003). The conceptual organization of the 
production structure is therefore as follows: GPTs lead to growth due to horizontal (and 
symmetric) GPT differentiation on the one hand, while further expansion of a GPT by adding 
more components raises the productivity of the corresponding GPT again, thus effectively 
breaking the symmetry between GPTs again. Neither innovation is so drastic that it does 
indeed completely drive out other ones, however they can be asymptotically drastic.
3 We are 
calling the drastic innovation born from basic R&D ￿the technology core￿ that gives birth to a 
new technology and enables the subsequent creation of a whole new GPT or even 
technological paradigm. The evolution of a new technology occurs as the result of 
incremental innovations that build on the core and that are horizontally differentiated. These 
incremental innovations belong to the same ￿technology family￿ as the core.
4 We are calling 
these incremental innovations that are born from applied R&D: ￿the technology peripherals￿. 
By assumption, the contribution of each peripheral to the overall technology decreases with 
the time of arrival of a peripheral, i.e. the most important peripherals are invented first.  
In the rest of this paper, we will be using the terms ￿core￿ and ￿peripherals￿ of a 
technology, instead of ￿drastic innovation￿ and ￿incremental innovation￿. This terminology 
allows us to think of every technology as being composed of first a core that could be seen as 
a potential GPT, and secondly peripherals that resemble intermediate goods as in Romer 
(1990) and van Zon and Yetkiner (2003). 
Our model, then, takes inspiration from the Aghion and Howitt (1992 and 1998 ch. 2) 
model and the Romer (1990) model. As in Romer (1990) we have many technologies being 
used at the same time, while as in van Zon and Yetkiner (2003), we allow for qualitative 
differences between technologies and between technology peripherals inside a technology. In 
                                                 
3 A GPT is therefore not drastic in the usual sense, and we would have preferred to use the term ￿technology 
family￿ for this situation, but for the name inflation this entails. The reason for this is that the term ￿family￿ 
refers to a technology group, and within a family we could have different generations of this technology. 
4 Just as Dosi (1988), when the new paradigm is generally accepted, a period of normal incremental innovations 
resumes along the trajectories defined by the new paradigm.   5
our model, therefore, productivity growth at the aggregate level is the result of both love of 
varieties and ￿inverted quality ladders￿.  
Further details of our model are as follows: As in the Romer model, a representative firm 
in the final goods sector produces output by using labour and a set of production technologies 
combined in an Ethier function (Ethier (1982)).
5 Each technology acts as a composite input 
made of different components belonging to that technology.  
In addition, the model consists of one basic R&D sector that generates each technology, 
and as many applied R&D sectors, as there are technologies, that develop these technologies 
by generating peripherals for each technology. The production function used to define the 
technology is a CES function of components, which are the core and peripherals. Contrary to 
Romer (1990), the peripheral contribution is no longer symmetric in our model.  Instead, a 
technology is assumed to consist of a core and of peripherals that contribute less and less to 
the productivity of the technology as a whole. But as in Romer (1990), the monopoly profits 
of the intermediate sectors are transferred to R&D workers in the form of wages (and profits 
unlike Romer (1990)), and researchers will continue to exploit positive profit opportunities of 
a current technology by making new peripherals. When peripheral profit opportunities 
become exhausted, it becomes more yielding to invest in a new technology. Researchers then 
switch to work on the next technology core. However, this switch is not complete, i.e. there is 
no bang-bang behaviour regarding the distribution of R&D workers over applied and basic 
R&D. The quest for technology peripherals is resumed within the new technology and 
continues until profit opportunities fall below that of other research alternatives, among which 
basic R&D. Thus, technological change and economic development follows a cyclical pattern. 
The model contributes to the growth literature in several ways: First, it introduces 
asymmetries in the intermediate goods market, which is rarely done in the literature.
6 This 
paper shows that asymmetric profit opportunities in intermediate goods sectors is more than a 
mere detail. Indeed, as Yetkiner (2003) points out, falling profits provide the real incentives to 
R&D to find the next completely new technology. Secondly, given the significant effects of 
technological change on economic growth, a better understanding of the reasons behind the 
cyclical evolution of output and technology is important from a policy perspective. In 
                                                 
5 Ethier (1982) defined an extension of the Cobb-Douglas production function. This Ethier￿s function results of 
two functions combination a Cobb Douglas and a CES.  In the context of technological change and economic 
growth, Romer (1990) used Ethier￿s production function with a variety of productive inputs. 
6 To our knowledge, van Zon and Yetkiner (2003) is the only work studying asymmetric intermediate sectors in 
an endogenous technological framework.   6
particular, smoothing the cyclical evolution may improve the long run performance of an 
economy (Yetkiner (2003)). Third, our model elaborates on the role of basic and applied 
R&D mechanisms in the growth process. It shows that the influence of these two R&D types 
on the long-run growth process is significantly different. 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we provide a brief review of some 
alternative approaches to modelling technological waves. In section 3, we explain the main 
features of our model. Section 4 contains the results. Finally, section 5 provides some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. Alternative Approaches regarding Technological Waves 
The literature on endogenous growth with technological innovations describes two kinds 
of models. The first kind represents horizontal product differentiation, i.e. a variety-expanding 
innovations. These models have for instance been developed by Romer (1990), Grossman and 
Helpman (1991, ch. 3), Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995, ch. 6). Secondly, Segerstrom, Anant 
and Dinopoulos (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch. 4), Aghion and Howitt (1992), 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, ch. 7), and Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch. 3) attribute 
economic growth to vertical product differentiation, i.e. to quality-improving innovations. 
Technological progress in both kinds of models is based on R&D, and the role of imperfect 
competition is to provide the incentives to engage in R&D. In R&D-based endogenous 
growth models, the pace of long-run growth is solely determined by the number of 
researchers, respectively by the level of research expenditure. Consequently, according to 
these models, subsidization of research leads unambiguously to a higher long-run growth 
rate.
7 
Surprisingly, drastic innovations have not received much attention in the growth literature. 
Precursory contributions include Jovanovic and Rob (1990) and Cheng and Dinopoulos 
(1992) who try to generate Schumpeterian waves based on the dichotomy between 
fundamental and secondary innovations, with each fundamental innovation being followed by 
a sequence of more and more incremental innovations. Of particular interest as a 
macroeconomic model is Cheng and Dinopoulos (1992), in which Schumpeterian waves are 
obtained as a unique, non steady-state, equilibrium solution, in which the current flow of 
monopoly profits follows a cyclical evolution: ￿Because the economy￿s wealth is equal to the 
                                                 
7 But not necessarily to higher welfare, because a reallocation of resources toward R&D goes at the expense of 
current production, hence current consumption and investment opportunities.   7
discounted present value of aggregate monopoly profits, fluctuations in profits generate 
procyclical fluctuations in wealth, the interest factor, consumption [￿] and aggregate R&D 
investment.￿ Solow (1997), also, follows an out of equilibrium approach by introducing in the 
Arrow (1962) learning by doing model the notion of discrete innovation. The learning by 
doing cannot sustain the growth rate indefinitely, however. That is why the introduction of 
discrete innovations as new objects of learning is necessary. And so a non-linearity appears in 
the learning function. The transition between two innovations is due to the learning process 
and does not lead to a slow down of the growth rate. The dichotomy between fundamental and 
secondary innovations goes further with the Aghion and Howitt (1998a) approach. In their 
chapter 6 called ￿Learning by doing and secondary innovations￿, Aghion and Howitt consider 
heterogeneity in the innovation process: the fundamental innovation comes from the research 
process and the secondary innovation from the production process.
8 They introduce a research 
capital concept, which is the mass of researchers, or workers who have chosen to do the 
research. They explain a growth rate slowdown by the fact that the work force switches from 
the production sector to the research sector. 
Another approach is the ￿general purpose technologies￿ (GPTs) approach initiated by 
David (1990) and especially Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995).
9 This approach focuses on the 
temporary cyclical effects that may be created by new technological paradigms at the 
beginning of their introduction to the economy. Each GPT raises output and productivity in 
the long run, it can also cause cyclical fluctuations while the economy adjusts to it. As David 
(1990) and Lipsey and Bekar (1995) have argued, such GPTs require costly restructuring and 
adjustment to take place, and there is no reason to expect this process to proceed smoothly 
over time. These cyclical downturns may be the price that society needs to pay in order to 
implement the GPTs that deliver the long-run growth.
10 These technological wave approaches 
can be summarizing by the title of Helpman and Trajtenberg (1994): ￿A Time to Sow and a 
Time to Reap￿. They develop a simple theoretical model in order to study the macroeconomic 
consequences of GPTs. In this model, monopolistic firms develop intermediate inputs and sell 
them to manufacturers of a final consumer good. Technological change is exogenous and 
appears at fixed time intervals. They find that each time an innovation occurs it creates a 
                                                 
8 Aghion and Howitt (1998a) pages 173 to 195. 
9 Examples of GPTs that have affected the entire economic system include the steam engine, the electric 
dynamo, the laser, and the computer. The future GPT could be nanotechnology.  
10 Thus, contrary to the predictions of real business cycle theory, the initial effect of a ￿positive technology 
shock￿ may not be to raise output, productivity and employment but to reduce them.   8
cycle: The first phase is the ￿time to sow￿, when the resources are used to the development of 
complementary factors, which are profitable to the new innovation. In this phase, the growth 
rate slows down. The second phase is the ￿time to reap￿, when enough complementary factors 
have been creating, it is useful to change the production process and to actually use the higher 
production potential of the new GPT. In this phase, the growth rate increases. 
Aghion and Howitt follow the Schumpeterian idea of technological fluctuations and the 
Kondratieff idea of long cycles to develop a number of models that are based on this notion. 
In Aghion and Howitt (1998b), the authors retain Helpman and Trajtenberg￿s framework and 
introduce externalities based on collective learning. This collective learning process benefits 
from and is necessary for the adoption of a new technology, while in turn it facilitates the 
adoption of still newer technologies. We could say that it is part of the diffusion process of a 
new technology. The macroeconomic effect is a slowdown after the arrival of the new 
technology.  
The main aim of the literature outlined above is to emphasize the difference between 
drastic technologies and incremental technological changes in terms of their growth 
implications. Currently, the focus seems to be on whether an economy experiences a 
slowdown at the beginning of a new technological change due to reallocation of resources 
from the old to the new sectors or not.
11  
 
3. The Model 
3.1 Introduction and overview 
GPTs are ex post mental constructs. During the innovation process, the actual 
pervasiveness of an innovation when and if it arrives can at best only be guessed at. This 
pervasiveness depends on the way in which an innovation can replace some productive 
function that was previously executed by other means, or on the way in which an innovation 
gives rise to the execution of functions that did not previously exist but have a high value of 
their own. Hence, if one wants to model the arrival of GPTs and their further development 
over time, one is logically forced to express the GPTs potential for productivity growth and 
expansion in terms of broad intrinsic characteristics, rather than stating up front that a specific 
                                                 
11 See several chapters in Helpman (1998).   9
innovation REPRESENTS a GPT by assumption.
12 In that sense all results of the basic 
innovation process are potential GPTs: it￿s only the extent of their use and their scope for 
further extension that change a potential GPT into a real one.  
The model we are about to present underlines these principles: GPTs all start off on an 
equal footing, i.e. they consist of a core invention that has a productive use that defines the 
nature of the GPT and its field of application. ￿Peripherals￿ can then be added to this core that 
increase the overall productivity of the GPT consisting of the ensemble of a core and its 
corresponding peripherals. The set of the core and its peripherals will further be called the 
components of a GPT. In such a setting, it seems logical to us that, as a rule, the peripherals 
that would contribute the most to the productivity of a GPT as a whole are added first, and 
more marginal peripherals are added later. This reflects our intuition that the scope for further 
expansion of the overall productivity of a GPT declines with the addition of still further 
components. Then again, love of variety, i.e. increased within GPT specialisation due to the 
increase in the number of components of a GPT, may counter this negative effect of the 
expansion of a GPT on its overall productivity. We conclude from this observation, that in 
order to properly describe these characteristics, we should use a specification of a GPT that 
allows for both love of variety (i.e. increasing returns due to increasing varieties) and 
decreasing returns to increasing varieties. We will implement this by using nested Ethier 
aggregator functions.
13 
In addition to this, we account for the probabilistic nature of the innovation process, 
including the question whether some innovation has the potential to become a GPT, by using 
Poisson processes to describe the arrival of innovations, ￿ la Aghion and Howitt (1992,1998). 
Furthermore, we randomly draw the intrinsic characteristics of the core of a potential GPT 
that matter for its future prospects for turning into a real GPT. So we do not know on 
beforehand whether a basic innovation will turn out to be the core of a real GPT with a large 
extension or of a GPT that does not have any peripherals at all (and that is therefore not a real 
GPT ex post, but a  ￿failed GPT￿ instead). 
We distinguish between two R&D processes with different functions. The growth of a 
potential GPT by adding peripherals is done through applied R&D, whereas the core of a 
potential GPT comes from basic R&D. Both types of R&D are explicitly accounted for in the 
                                                 
12 This has been the usual modelling approach up to now; again see Helpman (1998) and Helpman and 
Trajtenberg (1994), Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995). 
13 Ethier (1982) defined an extension of the Cobb-Douglas production function. In the context of technological 
change and economic growth, Romer (1990) used Ethier￿s production function with a variety of productive 
inputs.     10
model, as well as their relative size that is driven by profit incentives, very much as in Romer 
(1990) and in Aghion and Howitt (1992). We will show that even with the same specification 
of the R&D production processes, cyclical growth patterns will occur, where periods of 
relatively fast growth are followed by periods of slow growth, but not negative growth.  
In addition to this, we slightly depart from the usual specification of the R&D production 
function, where R&D output is directly proportional to current R&D input. We introduce 
decreasing returns to current R&D input, as in van Zon (2001), in order to avoid the bang-
bang R&D labour reallocations that are implied by the use of such proportional production 
functions in a perfect competition context (see, for instance, Yetkiner (2003)). Instead, what 
we will show is that basic R&D and applied R&D are processes that do indeed depend on 
each other, but that do not completely cannibalise each other although some nibbling or even 
a bite or two can occur.
14 
In the GPT literature, the slump in the growth of output generated by the arrival of a GPT 
is due to the fact that labour resources are drawn away from directly productive uses and are 
used instead for the further development of a GPT.
15 In reality the labour market is more 
segmented, and one would expect little or no production labour to flow into R&D sectors, 
certainly not of this production labour supplies what Romer (1990) refers to as ￿eye hand 
coordination￿. Research labour flowing into the final output sector is another matter. 
Presumably researchers are also capable of a satisfactory degree of ￿eye hand coordination￿, 
or white-collar activities. Nonetheless, we will take the position that there are two separate 
labour markets: one for production labour, and one for research labour, just to make the point 
that the cyclical development of output is not necessarily driven by people changing their 
overalls and putting on their laboratory kit, and the other way around.  
The qualitative results we expect from the modelling set-up outlined here and explained in 
more detail below, is that for given available labour resources, labour productivity can grow 
through the arrival of basic innovations that function as the core of a potential GPT that can 
turn into a real GPT if only the incentives to add more and more peripherals to the core are 
right. These incentives are driven by the way in which the GPT is used in final output 
production, but it is also driven by the scope for and costs of further expansion of the GPT 
through applied R&D. In general however, we would expect that the core arrival injects new 
profit opportunities into the economy that can be realised by inventing peripherals to the new 
core. In the end the incentives become less, because of the decrease in the marginal 
                                                 
14 Some nibbling will always take place because of the Inada conditions.  
15 See Helpman (1998).   11
contribution of the latest peripheral to the productivity of the GPT as a whole, and the relative 
incentive to engage in basic R&D again becomes stronger. We would expect therefore an 
arrival of a core to be followed by a spur of applied R&D activity, thus lowering the arrival 
rate of new GPTs. Depending on the rate of decrease of the marginal productivity of adding a 
peripheral versus the rate of increase of the overall productivity through love of variety, the 
growth rate may increase for a while before levelling off and falling again, or it may 
instantaneously increase and fall immediately but gently or even abruptly. Such developments 
will be sketched and explained in more detail in section 4, where we provide some illustrative 
model simulations. The remainder of this section is devoted to a detailed description of the 
different parts of the model. 
3.2  Final output production 
Final output is produced using a Cobb-Douglas production function that uses raw labour 
as an input, next to a capital aggregate that is assumed to have a GPT inner-structure given by 
a symmetric CES function. This combination effectively results in an Ethier function for final 
output, very much as in Romer (1990), but without the human capital present there: 
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where Y represents final output, Ly production labour, and Ke is the effective capital 
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where A is the number of GPTs currently active, and j indexes those active GPTs. zj represents 
the ￿volume￿ of GPT j. Obviously, equation (2) is a CES function with a symmetric 
contribution of all factors zj to the level of effective capital Ke. The final good sector is 
perfectly competitive, and because the production function is homogeneous of degree one, 
final good production can be described as the production by a representative firm.  
An important aspect of the model is that inputs are not perfect substitutes: GPTs are better 
substitutes for each other than labour and the effective capital aggregate are. Equations (1)   12
and (2) provide a very simple structure, that can easily be generalised.
16 Indeed, three obvious 
generalisations of (2) spring to mind:  
-  a Mukerji (1963) function instead of a CES, so that some GPTs may be more 
substitutable for other GPTs than others; 
-  a CES but with different contributions of each GPT to final output; 
-  a CES with a within capital complex Ke elasticity of substitution that is not 
necessarily equal to  ) 1 /( 1 α − . 
However, our immediate aim is to show what difference the multi-level organisation of 
the production process and its interpretation in terms of GPT and their composing components 
makes for the way in which growth may take place. That is why we use ￿standard￿ growth 
model components from the toolbox provided by the models of Romer (1990) and Aghion 
and Howitt (1992). It is only the ￿new combination￿ that we make of these growth-tools that 
we want to investigate in terms of its impact on growth patterns. 
 
3.3 The GPT inner-structure 
A GPT is assumed to consist of a core and of peripherals that contribute less and less to 
the productivity of the GPT as a whole. Because we want to stick as closely as possible to the 
original Romer (1990) model, because of its love of variety features, an obvious candidate to 
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where xi,j for i>0 represents the i-th peripheral of GPT j and x0,j represents the size of the core 
of GPT j.
17  ci, j are the standard distribution parameters one normally uses with a CES 
function, while  ) 1 /( 1 j β −  is the elasticity of substitution between all the components of GPT 
j. Aj is the number of peripherals belonging to GPT j. In the very early stages of a GPT, Aj can 
                                                 
16 We will not do this here, because the behaviour we have obtained with the simple structure described here is 
already interesting enough by itself, as we will show in section 4 later on. 
17 Peripherals can be vaguely associated with ￿innovational complementarity￿ character of GPTs as advanced by 
Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995), that is ￿the productivity of R&D in a downstream sector increases as a 
consequence of innovation in the GPT technology￿. In fact the notion of complementarity hides the 
interpretation of productivity increases due to improved division of production tasks between intermediates, 
whereas formally individual intermediates are direct substitute for each other.   13
actually be equal to zero, and in fact, as we will illustrate in the next section, even in the 
medium and long run, Aj can remain equal to zero, thus underlining the ex post character of 
what we consider to be real GPTs i.e. technologies with a large number of peripherals. For 
GPTs with a small number of peripherals Aj, we will use the term ￿failed GPTs￿ from now 
on. 
In order to simplify matters as much as possible, we will make the following assumptions: 
 
j j ∀ =α β            ( 4 . A )  
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Assumption (4.A) reduces the three-level organisation of the production process effectively to 
a two-level production function with asymmetric contributions of all components of all GPTs 
to final output, while (4.B) puts a technically useful structure on the distribution coefficients 
of the implied aggregate production function. This structure allows us to write the production 
function in terms of an aggregate of mathematical transformations of the cores of the various 
GPTs only, so from a practical point of view we can essentially forget about individual 
peripherals. This is a big technical bonus since we have to deal with a number of ￿real GPTs￿ 
simultaneously. (4.B) states that the CES distribution coefficients are geometrically declining 
with the peripheral index. 
 
3.4 The demand for GPT components 
The demand for GPTs is derived very much as in Romer (1990). Assumption (4.A) and 
equations (3) and (2) when substituted into (1), give rise to the following inverse demand 
equations for each individual component, under the assumption of perfect competition in the 
final output market: 
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Assuming as in Romer (1990) that the components can be produced using raw capital only, 
where each component i of GPT j takes  j η  units of raw capital ki,j to create one unit of the   14
component xi,j, the marginal production costs are equal to  r j ⋅ η  , where r is the interest rate 
and where we have ignored the depreciation of capital. Because each component has its own 
market niche (as described by (5)), the profit maximising rental price of each component is 
easily obtained as: 
 
α η / , j j i r p ⋅ =            ( 6 )  
 
which is the familiar Amoroso Robinson condition for profit maximisation under imperfect 
competition. 
Using (6) to obtain total profits per component, we find: 
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where  j i, π  are the profits associated with the i-th component of GPT j. Equation (7) has some 
interesting features. First, profits of a component rise with the overall level of final output 
production as proxied by Ly. Secondly, they fall with a rise in the production cost of a 
component (i.e.  j r η ⋅ ), while third they fall with the peripheral index i (since  1 0 π π j ς ). The 
latter is one of the most important drivers of the overall behaviour of the model. Note too that 
for constant values of Ly and r, ex post profit flows are constant too. Under these assumptions, 
the present value of the profit stream associated with using a peripheral would be given by:  
 
r PV j i j i / , , π π =            ( 8 )  
 
where  j i PV , π  represents the present value of the profit flows obtained from renting 
component i of GPT j. As in Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), we assume that 
these flows are captured by the respective R&D sectors that created the designs for these 
components. 
 
3.5 R&D activity 
The blueprints that are needed to be able to produce GPTs are obtained by the 
intermediate goods sectors from the R&D sector. We assume that each innovation, whether   15
basic or applied, is the result of innovative activities from labour in that sector. This labour is 
endowed with the frontier knowledge that is required to do research and can be engaged in 
basic or applied R&D. The determination of the activity, which the research labour engages 
in, depends on the relative profitability of both types of R&D. The relative profitability of 
both types of R&D depends on the profitability of adding peripherals to an already existing 
technology (for which the core already exists) versus creating a completely new technology 
(for which a new core is required). As we will show, the profitability of peripheral falls the 
later it is introduced, so that there is a certain point at which pursuing basic R&D becomes 
increasingly more profitable than doing applied R&D, and research labour shifts from doing 
applied research to doing basic research. However, the shift is not complete for reasons made 
clear further below. Whatever the specific engagement of R&D labour, the output of research 
labour is always an innovation, which we assume is patented and which serves as an input to 
the production of composite goods. The costs of producing components of a GPT, therefore, 
include the costs of getting hold of the patent. 
Our motivation behind considering different R&D processes for the case of a peripheral 
on the one hand and that of a core on the other hand is our perception that the invention of a 
technology core requires ￿something more fundamental￿ than the further development of a 
technology by adding peripherals. We capture this difference by differentiating their 
contribution to total production. However, we also feel that finding a (core of a) potential 
GPT is subject to more uncertainty than finding a peripheral once a new technological ￿proto-
paradigm￿ has arrived in the form of a potential GPT. We model this by assuming that the 
R&D process itself is uncertain first because it is not able to predict the arrival of a GPT, and 
secondly because it is not able to predict the actual characteristics of a potential GPT, that we 
assume to be known only after the arrival of its core. The expectations one has had about the 
inherent productivity of the next GPT (i.e. c0,j), about the production costs of the peripherals 
(i.e. r. j η  ), the scope for extension (i.e.  j ς ), associated applied research productivity (i.e.  j δ ) 
and research opportunities (i.e.  j µ  ) will prove to have been too optimistic or too pessimistic 
if and when the new core arrives. 
We distinguish between basic and applied R&D but model both types along the same 
lines. R&D gives rise to innovations that arrive according to a Poisson probability distribution 
with arrival parameter λ . According to this distribution, the probability that an event (arrival 
of an innovation) occurs within T time units from now, is equal to F(T)=1-
T e
⋅ −λ .    16
As in Aghion and Howitt, we assume that the level of R&D activities directly and 
positively influence the arrival rate of innovations. Unlike Aghion and Howitt (1992), 
however, we assume that there are decreasing marginal returns to current R&D, giving rise to 
an effective arrival rate of innovations given by: 
 
e
j j j R ⋅ = µ λ            ( 9 . A )  
β δ j j
e
j R R ⋅ =            ( 9 . B )  
 
where  j λ  is the arrival rate of innovations associated with R&D process j (process 0 is 
associated with the basic R&D necessary to find the core of the next GPT, whereas j>0 
represent the processes necessary to find the next peripheral of GPT j).  j µ  is the arrival rate 
at a unit volume of effective R&D, R
e
j. Equation (9.B) shows how effective R&D uses R&D 
labour Rj with an average ￿productivity￿ equal to  j δ  at unit level, and where  1 0 π π β  
ensures that the marginal product of R&D labour falls with the level of R&D input. The latter 
is another main feature of the model, since it ensures that in combination with (8), the 
marginal benefits of doing applied R&D and basic R&D are asymptotically falling to zero for 
increasing levels of R&D inputs. But more importantly, they rise to infinity for levels of R&D 
inputs that fall asymptotically to zero. The latter ensures, that it will always be profitable to 
employ a non-zero volume of R&D workers on any project, however bleak the prospects for 
success may be.  
The marginal benefits from doing R&D on the i-th peripheral of GPT j are now given by: 
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Due to the free mobility of R&D labour between its various uses, the marginal benefits for 
different R&D activities should be the same, giving rise to the following optimum ratio of 
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where Ai is the number of peripherals of GPT j, and A is the total number of active GPTs. 
Equation (11) shows that higher (expected) profit flows on a peripheral in some GPT will 
divert R&D resources into further expanding that GPT. Such expansion is promoted by an 
R&D process that is relatively efficient (high  j δ ), or where innovations are relatively easy 
because of ample ￿fishing￿ opportunities (high value of the arrival parameter j µ ). Because 
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A rise in the present value of some expected profit flow will therefore raise the corresponding  
j ϕ  and for given R, the corresponding value of Rj will unambiguously rise at the expense of 
other R&D activities, thus leading to a direct trade-off between applied and basic R&D 
activities, i.e. expansion of existing GPTs versus the creation of new ones. 
  
3.6 Interest rate determination 
As in Romer (1990), capital in this model is accumulated consumption foregone. 
Furthermore, capital is completely putty. The amount of investment is given by a proportional 
saving function, as for instance in the neo-classical growth model. The interest rate is 
assumed to adjust instantaneously and continuously until the total demand for physical capital 
exactly matches the supply of capital in the form of accumulated consumption foregone. 
Interestingly enough, this set-up does provide a link, at least in principle, between changes 
in the saving rate and the rate of technical change, in as far as these changes succeed in 
changing both available investment-capital and the interest rate. The reason is that a lower 
supply of financial capital (due to lower savings for instance), raises the interest rate, which in 
turn depresses the incentives to engage in R&D. In our model, however, relative R&D 
activities do not depend on the interest rate, whereas total R&D labour is given by 
assumption. Hence, a decrease in savings would lower the wage rate of R&D workers directly 
(less demand for R&D labour for the same supply), while the marginal product of labour in 
the final output sector would also be negatively affected, but less so than the marginal benefits   18
of R&D labour in the R&D sectors.
18 Consequently, a rise in the rate of interest will lower 
real wages everywhere but more so in R&D activities. 
 
3.7 Model closure 
The model is closed by assuming a proportional saving function, giving rise to: 
 
Y s K ⋅ = ∆               ( 1 3 )  
 
where ∆ is the first difference operator, and s is the constant saving rate, and where we have 
disregarded the depreciation of capital. 
 
3.8 Concluding remarks: Love of variety issues 
Equation (13) describes the accumulation of physical capital. However it is the 
organisation of this capital in the form of different GPTs with differential impacts on effective 
capital that ultimately results in the growth of capital productivity, hence output itself, for a 
given amount of labour and in the absence of labour augmenting technical change. This is 
easy to see, since after some manipulation of the relation between effective capital and the 
respective sizes of the core, as well as the capital costs of building the core (and the 
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The ￿effective capital￿ productivity of ￿raw￿ capital depends positively on the size of the 
contribution of the core (i.e. c0,j), positively on the scope for extension of the GPT (i.e.  j ς ), 
negatively on the raw capital cost per unit of effective capital ( j η ), but most importantly, 
positively on the number of peripherals of the GPT, (i.e. Aj). The latter is the love of variety 
effect implied by the concavity of the effective capital aggregate in its individual components 
                                                 
18 The marginal product of labour is proportional to output and the partial output elasticity of labour, and 
inversely proportional to the given number of final output workers. So, as long as the number of workers exceeds 
the value of the partial output elasticity of labour, the change in the final output wage rate due to a one-unit 
change in accumulated savings is smaller than the marginal product of capital.    19
(cf. equation (3)). Love of variety works at two different levels in this model, however, as 
opposed to Romer (1990). It works at the component level within each individual GPT, but 
also at the level of the GPTs that are used to produce final output.  
 




  The model we have outlined above, will be used for some illustrative simulations. In 
order to do that we have implemented it in the following way. First we have assumed that 
basic R&D is intrinsically more uncertain than applied R&D. This results in an allocation of 
R&D resources between basic and applied R&D activities, where the marginal benefits from 
doing basic R&D are uncertain, whereas those from applied R&D on active GPT￿s are not. 
We model this by assuming that expected profits are based on the expected values of the 
driving parameters (arrival parameters, R&D productivity parameters, and so on). For the 
profit flows coming from the invention and subsequent use of new peripherals, we assume 
that all the defining characteristics are know given the characteristics of the core. 
  The flow of logic of the model is now as follows. Profitability expectations drive the 
allocation of R&D workers over their various uses. Draws from the various Poisson 
distributions for basic R&D but also for applied R&D of the active GPT￿s lead to a success (a 
new peripheral for applied R&D, or a new potential GPT for basic R&D) or not. Whatever the 
exact time of the success, R&D resources are assumed to be allocated for an entire tick of the 
clock and will not be used for other purposes if and when the innovation happens within a tick 
of the clock. 
  The subsequent arrival of a GPT or (set of) peripherals changes the relative 
profitability of a GPT (hence of expanding all active GPT￿s) and that of the peripherals 
making up a GPT. This normally leads to a reallocation of R&D resources in the direction of 
applied R&D after the moment of invention of the core of a new GPT, unless the further 
extension of an old and active GPT proves to be more profitable. This could be the case if the 
scope for extension of the new GPT is very high, or the effective applied R&D productivity is 
very low. We will show such an instance further below. 
If by pure chance a GPT does not arrive for any length of time, applied R&D while 
expanding exisiting GPT￿s runs slowly out of gas (i.e. profit opportunities), thus making basic   20
R&D relatively more attractive, and ensuring (in a probabilistic way) that new expansion 
possibilities will arise in the future with the timely arrival of a new GPT. 
  A GPT, if and when it arrives, needs capital to be implemented next to other existing 
GPT￿s. If the contribution of the new GPT to final output is non marginal, the interest rate 
will be driven up, thus crowding out the other GPT￿s in the process, as well as their expansion 
possibilities through applied R&D. This switching between different types of R&D smoothes 
the growth spikes that are inherently tied to the random arrival of new GPT￿s and new 
peripherals. Indeed the fact that there are multiple GPT￿s active at the same time, further 
smooths the growth process, in that the joint activity on expanding existing GPT￿s lowers the 
probability that no peripheral or GPT core will arrive during a tick of the clock. This is by no 
means just a diversification issue. Due to the assumed decrease in the marginal productivity of 
R&D labour, having available more GPT expansion possibilities absolutely raises the 
productivity of the group of R&D workers as a whole, due to the assumed concavity of the 
R&D production functions.  
  After the arrival of an innovation, it is active from the next period. If the innovation 
pertains to the core of a new GPT, new peripherals can be looked for from the next period, 
and they can be added to the core again after the period of their invention. 
 
4.2 Parameter sets 
 
  In order to perform some model simulations, we have chosen the following parameter 
set, that is listed in Table 1 below. 
 
Param Value Param Value Param Value 
j δ   2  j µ   0.5 s  0.1 
0 δ   0.8  0 µ   0.1 Ly 100 
j ς   0.9  α   0.4 R  5 
j η   1  β   0.5 K0 0.2 
     
Table 1. Base run parameter set 
 
In the table above, the parameters with an index 0 refer to the basic R&D process, 
while those indexed with a j are GPT specific. The actual value for each GPT is drawn from a   21
uniform distribution on the range from 0 to the corresponding value in the table above. The 
expected value of each parameter that is GPT specific is therefore 50 percent of the values in 
the Table. An exception is the GPT expansion scope parameter  j ς . The value in the table 
represents the minimum value of that parameter, whereas the actual value is drawn randomly 
from the uniform distribution ranging from the minimum to a value equal to 1. Finally, the 
distribution parameters c0,j are drawn from a uniform distribution again, where the expected 
value is 2.5 percent above the value realized for the previous GPT, where we do allow for a 
fall in the value of the distribution parameter with uniform probability 0.25.
19 The distribution 
parameter of the core of the first GPT is drawn from a uniform random distribution on the 































Figure 1. GPT characteristics 
 
In Figure 1, the bars labelled ￿AVG￿ correspond to the average value of the parameters 
over all GPT￿s 1-14, since those are the GPT￿s that arrived during a simulation period ranging 
from 1-300. The characteristics of these GPT￿s are summarised in the columns labelled 
GPT1-GPT14. Since the effective productivity of the corresponding applied R&D processes 
                                                 
19 This is implemented by means of the following rule x=x0.(1+4*r*y-y). Here y is the required average 
percentage increase in x w.r.t. x0, while r is a uniform random variable on the range 0-1. Since the expected 
value for r is equal to 0.5, we will have that the expected value for x is equal to x0.(1+y), as required. If however, 
r is below 0.25, x<x0, so x can indeed fall, even when the drift is equal to y>0.   22
are given by the products of  j δ  and  j µ , we do not present these parameters separately, 
although they are conceptually different. The vertical axis of the Figure measures the relative 
distance of a parameter value in the range of all values of that parameter for all GPT￿s 1-14. 
The respective ranges are listed in Table 2 below. 
 
 C0  DELTA*MU  ETA  ZETA 
MINOBS 0.000330 0.002940 0.028786 0.902272 
MAXOBS  0.000465 0.814718 0.954599 0.988458 
RANGE  0.000135 0.81177  0.925813 0.086186 
 
Table 2. Ranges of variation for the random parameters 
 
In Table 2, MINOBS is the minimum value of the parameter in question and MAXOBS is the 
corresponding maximum value. RANGE is the difference between MAXOBS and MINOBS. 
The entries in Figure 1 can now readily be obtained from the actual random parameter value 
and the entries in Table 2 above.
20  
Looking at Figure 1, we can observe two broad tendencies: C0 is indeed rising on 
average with the GPT index, as it should be, while there is no definite patterns in the other 
parameters, again as it should be. 
 
4.3 Simulation Results and Interpretation 
 
  Based on Figure 1, we can categorise the various GPT￿s by their above or below 
average (positive) impact on profitability. So, since η  influences profitability in a negative 
way, a value below average for η  means an above average positive impact on profitability. 
Henceforth, we obtain the following table, where a + means above average impact on 
profitability, a minus means below average impact on profitability and a zero means roughly 
average impact on profitability. 
 
                                                 
20 This can be done by applying the following ￿rule￿: entry Table 1 = 100*(actual value random parameter ￿ 
corresponding MINOBS)/corresponding RANGE.  
   23
GPT  C0,j  j j δ µ ⋅   j ς   j η   Arrival 
Period 
Category 
1 -  ++  -  -  1  Success 
2 - -  +  -  11  Niche  Success 
3 -  0  -  --  52  Niche  success 
4 - -  +  -  54  Failure 
5 - -  -  --  56  Failure 
6 -  +  +  +  57  Big  Hit 
7 0  0  +  +  119  Success 
8 0  --  -  -  159  Failure 
9 +  0  +  +  163  Success 
10 + +  +  +  182  Success 
11 + --  +  -  217  Failure 
12 + 0  0  -  237  Niche  success 
13 + --  0  +  245  Failure 
14 + +  -  ++  280  Big  Hit? 
 
Table 3. A tentative GPT categorization 
 
The categorization in the last column comes from the development over time of the number of 
peripherals. The latter is shown in Figure 3. But first we present the development over time of 
the number of GPT￿s that are active at each moment in time in Figure 2, for the parameter sets 
provided in Tables 1 and 2. 
The economy starts with only one active GPT and develops more potential GPT￿s so 
that after 300 periods (further called years for ease of exposition) it has 14 potential GPT￿s 
available. A new GPT arrives on average every 21 periods, but the intervals between the 
arrival of one GPT and the next are far from regular. In this simulation run, for instance, the 
￿Fifties￿ are a very innovative period, witnessing the arrival of three new GPT￿s, but after this 
innovative burst it takes more than 60 years for GPT 7 to arrive. 
In Figure 3, we present the development over time of the number of peripherals by 
GPT. This figure makes it clear that the success of a potential GPT depends not only on its 
intrinsic characteristics, but also on the timing of its arrival. GPT 1, for instance, develops a 
large number of peripherals, but only because it faces no serious competition until GPT 3   24
arrives. After the arrival of GPT 3 the growth of GPT 1 slows down dramatically. It is quite 
evident that GPT 1 would have been much less successful if GPT 3 had arrived earlier. GPT 
3, in turn, might have become a real success had it not been outcompeted by the superior GPT 
6. This is why we have categorised GPT 3 as a ￿niche success￿ in Table 3. 
Measuring the GPT character by the sheer extension of each GPT in terms of the 
number of peripherals, GPT 6 is clearly the ￿big hit￿. GPT￿s 1, 7, 9, and in particular 10 also 
do reasonably well, earning a slot in the category ￿success￿. GPT 12 has developed only 7 
peripherals by the end of the simulation period, which is not much, but this number is still 
growing, so we generously put it in the category ￿niche success￿. At the end of the period, we 
see GPT 14 emerging in the year 280 and developing 9 peripherals in only 19 years. If its 
growth continues at such a pace, it may become a big hit in the future. Finally, turning to the 
bottom of the graph, we see that a number of potential GPT￿s have never developed more than 
a handful of peripherals. These are ￿failed￿ GPTs￿, consisting only of a core or of a core and 
very few peripherals. Such technologies ￿ while possibly quite profitable ￿ certainly do not 
fulfil the definition of a GPT. The interesting point about these ￿failed￿ GPT￿s is that we see 
them as non-GPT￿s in our ex post perspective, but the researchers who developed them were 
seeing them as potential GPT￿s, because they had no way of knowing their characteristics ex 
ante. 
The number of peripherals allows us to say something about the usefulness of a 
potential GPT, but it does not tell us very much about the economic impact of the GPT. But 
one important characteristic of a GPT is that it affects a large share of the economy. In order 
to measure the economic impact of a GPT - its ￿market share￿ so to speak ￿ we show the 
Eulerian contribution of each GPT to effective capital Ke.
21 in Figure 4. 
The curves in Figure 4 can also be thought of as ￿diffusion curves￿, because they show 
a similar phenomenon.
22 These diffusion curves show a cyclical pattern, which is consistent 
with some long wave views on economic development. Freeman and Perez (1988), for 
example, identify five Kondratieffs in economic history since the late 18
th century. Such 
Kondratieffs are characterised by the dominant GPT of their times, for instance the ￿steam 
                                                 


































/ 1 θ  where  j θ  therefore measures the contribution 
according to Euler of effective capital belonging to GPT j to aggregate effective capital. 
22 The reader may notice that in the diffusion literature the usual form of a diffusion curve is S-shaped, in 
contrast to our ￿diffusion curves￿. The reason for the common S-shape are learning effects, scale economies, 
imperfect information etc. In our model, however, such effects are absent, so that ￿diffusion￿ starts at a fast pace, 
slowing down as the extension possibilities (indicated by ζj) of the GPT are being exploited.   25
power and railway Kondratieff￿ in the mid-19
th century or the ￿information and 
communication Kondratieff￿ that started in the late 20
th century. 
In our model we can identify similar Kondratieffs: The ￿GPT 1 Kondratieff￿ gives 
way to the ￿GPT 6 Kondratieff￿ around the year 60, when GPT 6 overtakes GPT 1 in Figure 
4. The GPT 6 Kondratieff reaches its climax between 110 and 120. It then undergoes a 
transformation into the ￿GPT 6 and 7 Kondratieff￿, during which GPT 6 remains the 
dominant GPT, but GPT 7 also plays a major role. In the year 159 (when GPT 9 is invented), 
the simulation economy begins a long transition towards the ￿GPT 9 Kondratieff￿, which 
begins around the year 200 and finally gives way to the ￿GPT 10 Kondratieff￿ around 245. 
Towards the end of the period, another major transition comes about: GPT 14 starts its steep 
rise and becomes the dominant GPT in terms of its contribution to Ke only 12 years after being 
invented. 
Note that in contrast to many long wave theories, there is nothing mechanistic in the 
coming and going of Kondratieffs in our model. Due to the structure of the model every GPT 
will at some time run out of further extension possibilities, and the search for a new GPT 
begins, but the length of these ￿long waves￿ is endogenously determined and highly variable. 
Another interesting observation concerns the length of the transition periods between 
two successive Kondratieffs. The transition from the GPT 1 Kondratieff to the GPT 6 
Kondratieff is rather quick, but others are not. GPT 10, for example, is invented in 182 (when 
GPT 6 is still dominant), and it takes more than 60 years for GPT 10 to assume a dominant 
position. In order to explain the speed of these transitions, it is quite useful to look at the 
developments in the R&D sector. 
Figure 5 depicts the allocation of researchers to applied R&D on the available GPTs. 
This is where things get exciting, because the R&D sector is really what drives the economy 
in our model, even though the fixed number of researchers (5) is quite low in comparison to 
the number of final output workers (100). In order to gain a complete overview over the R&D 
sector, we will also refer to Figure 6, which depicts the allocation of researchers between 
basic R&D and applied R&D. 
Just like in Figure 4, we clearly observe cycles in R&D. The usual pattern is as 
follows. A new, potential GPT enters the market. If it is an attractive technology for research 
(in terms of the characteristics shown in Table 1), research labour moves into applied R&D on 
the new technology. This can produce drastic changes: The really successful GPT￿s attract 
around 90% of all researchers, and GPT 14 is so attractive that it absorbs virtually all research 
labour. Naturally, this crowds out the other GPT￿s as well as basic research. The jumps that   26
we observe in Figure 6 all relate to the introduction of a new, successful GPT. We can also 
see from these two figures that the arrival of ￿failed￿ GPT￿s, such as that of GPT 11 in the 
year 217, does not affect the allocation of researchers, because ￿failed￿ GPT￿s do not attract 
any applied R&D. 
Upon introduction of an attractive GPT, a lot of researchers move into applied R&D 
on that GPT. They quickly develop a number of peripherals. Due to our assumptions about the 
nature of technologies, however, they run out of extension possibilities, and further research 
on this GPT becomes less attractive. Thus, researchers move gradually into applied R&D on 
other GPT￿s and into basic R&D on the next potential GPT. One can nicely see this at the end 
of the period: GPT 14 attracts a lot of researchers upon introduction, but its scope for 
extension (ζ14) is low. Therefore, the attractiveness of applied R&D diminishes quickly, and 
GPT 10 is starting to experience a renaissance at least in terms of R&D. 
Generally, we observe that the R&D sector is ￿leading￿ the rest of the economy. When 
a new GPT is introduced, the R&D sector moves in quickly, developing products and getting 
hold of the patents. It then moves into other activities, either basic R&D or applied R&D on 
the next GPT. This phenomenon is especially obvious in the case of GPT￿s 9 and 10. The 
￿GPT 9 Kondratieff￿ begins in the year 200, although GPT 9 was invented nearly 40 years 
before that. In the meantime, research labour has to a large extent left the GPT 9 sector and 
has moved on to applied R&D on GPT 10. 
It is precisely this movement between different R&D activities that generate growth in 
the model. Each individual GPT￿s scope for extension is limited, and when this limit is 
approached, researchers move towards basic R&D, searching for the next GPT. These 
movements generate cycles in the composition of the economy and its growth rate. This last 
claim can be seen in Figure 7, which shows the growth rate of output and a dummy that takes 
the value 1 in those years when a new GPT arrives. Successful GPT￿s have two effects on 
growth: First, they raise output immediately in the period after their introduction, simply 
because of our love of variety assumption. But secondly, and more importantly, they raise the 
average growth rate over a period of several decades, as researchers are exploiting the new 
possibilities for applied R&D. This can be seen in the case of GPT 6, for example. Right after 
its arrival, the growth rate jumps up to an impressive 6.7 percent. Then, during the ￿GPT 6 
Kondratieff￿, we observe growth rates that are (on average) gradually declining. It is the 
arrival of GPT 7 in the year 119 that sets off another period of high growth rates. 
The growth impact of new GPT￿s, of course, depends on the GPT￿s pervasiveness. In 
the extreme case, a total failure with no peripherals at all, we have only a short-lived growth   27
hike due to the love of variety effect. This uncertainty about future growth rates is also a 
realistic feature of the model: We know that a new successful GPT will arrive, and that it will 
set off a period of high growth, but we can never know when this will happen. 
 
4.4 Policy Relevance 
 
Clearly, in our model the transitions from one technological regime to another are not 
painful because many consequences of real world transition are missing: creative destruction 
in the form of obsolescence of skills and capital, unemployment, redistribution of income and 
wealth etc. In order to alleviate the pain associated with such adjustments, some government 
intervention may be called for that to some extent mitigates the fierceness of the reallocations 
of labour implied by the arrival and subsequent takeover of new GPTs. Extensions of the 
model in this direction are left for future research, though.  
The model simulations we have performed clearly illustrate that the engine of growth 
in this model is a two-stroke engine. The two cylinders, basic R&D and applied R&D, fire in 
turns, the first churning out a new GPT and the latter sputtering out a number of peripherals 
for the new GPT. The R&D market performs the function of an ignition distributor: Whenever 
the applied R&D cylinder loses momentum, the market reallocates researchers to the basic 
R&D cylinder in order to produce a new GPT. Note that this mechanism is not necessarily 
efficient. There are all sorts of market imperfections involved, and there may be ample scope 
for government policy to tune up the engine by influencing the allocation of R&D efforts. 
Such policy interventions may result in higher acceleration (faster growth) or more 
horsepower (higher consumption per capita). Again, this is left for future research. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have presented a simple model that allows for the occurrence of 
innovations that can develop into GPTs. The model consists of a multi-layered Ethier 
production function and has roughly the same structure as Romer (1990) and Aghion and 
Howitt (1992). It is supposed to explain the cyclical pattern in output growth, without having 
to resort to contractions of final output production itself in response to favourable R&D 
prospects, since the mobility of labour between final output production and R&D activities   28
seems to be limited to say the least, quite apart from the low share of R&D workers in total 
employment, and therefore the limited effect of their complete reallocation towards final 
output production. In our model, R&D workers can only switch between different types of 
R&D: basic R&D that injects the core of a potentially new GPT into the economic system, 
and that supplies the potential for further expansion through applied R&D that adds 
peripherals to this core. We show using simulations with this model, in which the arrival of 
the basic and applied innovations are governed by Poisson processes as in Aghion and Howitt 
(1992) that the arrival of a successful GPT does indeed bring about a reallocation of R&D 
activities towards applied R&D, thus (on average) postponing the moment of arrival of the 
next GPT. Meanwhile, applied R&D raises the productivity of the GPT as a whole, but the 
profitability of finding the next peripheral falls in the process, thus diminishing the incentives 
to engage in further applied R&D and increasing the incentives to move into basic R&D 
activities again. Thus we obtained a cyclical pattern in growth that is partly driven by the 
arrival of the underlying GPTs but that are also internally driven by the continuing 
development of and development races between active GPTs in the absence of the arrival of 
new ones. We even have seen instances of failed GPTs that are a contradictio in terminis, of 
course. However, by generating failed GPTs, the model illustrates our notion that a GPT is 
essentially an ex post concept, that is therefore relatively empty, unless one is able to link the 
ex post performance of an innovation to its basic characteristics in terms of wider 
applicability, scope for expansion, efficiency of expansion processes as well as associated 
production processes, and so on. We have shown that exactly these characteristics do indeed 
define the success or failure of a GPT, i.e. the answer to the question whether to be or not to 
be a real GPT.   
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2:: The number of GPTs over time 
 
 


























3: The number of peripherals for each GPT 
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Figure 4: Relative contribution to effective capital 
 
 

























Figure 5: Applied R&D trade-offs 
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Figure 7: Final output growth 